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The problem of decision making under uncertainty is considered. It is noted that an alternative is
described in terms of an uncertainty proﬁle. We observe that a major diﬃculty in the decision process
is the comparison of these uncertainty proﬁles. We discuss the need for introducing some features of
an uncertainty proﬁle to help simplify this comparison. We note that the quantiﬁcation of these sim-
plifying features involves some subjective considerations about the decision makers preferences. We
introduce the idea of the decision makers attitudinal character to help in the formulation of these
considerations. We then investigate two important features associated with an uncertainty proﬁle.
The ﬁrst, the representative value, is a generalization of expected value commonly used under prob-
abilistic uncertainty. The second, called the measure of deviation, provides a generalization of the
concept of variance. We show how these new measures allows us to consider uncertainty proﬁles
other then just the probabilistic one. They also allow us introduce other decision maker attitudes
then the one implicitly assumed with the expected value and variance.
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Risk based decision making involves making a decision in the face of alternatives that
have uncertain outcomes. It is sometimes referred to as decision-making under uncertainty0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2005.09.001
* Tel.: +1 212 249 2047; fax: +1 212 249 1689.
E-mail address: yager@panix.com
138 R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 42 (2006) 137–158(DMUU). In DMUU, we generally have a collection of alternative actions and must select
one of these. Associated with each alternative is an uncertainty proﬁle, which consists of
the collection of outcomes that can occur as a result of selecting this alternative. The
uncertainty proﬁle may also contain some knowledge about the propensity of each of
the outcomes to occur. A probability distribution is a prototypical example of an uncer-
tainty proﬁle. The basic task in DMUU is to compare these alternatives, more speciﬁcally
compare the uncertainty proﬁles, and then decide upon a best alternative. The diﬃculty
here is that the uncertainty proﬁles are usually more complex objects than a human can
easily compare. Essentially, the dimensionality of the uncertainty proﬁles, along with
the multiplicity of alternatives make this comparison diﬃcult. One way in which to address
this problem is to associate with each alternatives uncertainty proﬁle a small number of
surrogate features and then compare the alternatives using these surrogate features.
One important example of a surrogate feature is the representative value. This provides
a kind of typical or anticipated outcome of an uncertainty proﬁle. The expected value is a
prototypical example of this. However more generally these representative values are
means [1,2] or weighted means of the possible payoﬀs associated with an alternative. A
basic feature of the representative value is idempotency, if an alternatives outcome is cer-
tain then this is its representative value. More generally boundedness is a feature of the
representative value, it should lie between the largest and smallest possible outcomes.
Another class of surrogate values are what we shall refer to as measures of deviation or
variability. This is a scalar value that provides some indication of how variable is the
uncertainty proﬁle of an alternative. A prototypical example of this is the measure of var-
iance used in probability theory. One property of these measures of deviation is that if all
the payoﬀs are the same for some alternative it should have minimal variability. It also
should be bounded by the diﬀerence between an alternatives largest and smallest possible
outcomes.
In trying to get a deeper understanding of the decision process, we would like to for-
mally distinguish between two distinguished entities (roles) that are an important part
of the decision process. These entities can be played by diﬀerent people or the same person.
The ﬁrst entity is what we call the analyst and the second is what we call the executive. It
is the executive who is responsible for the decision, using modern management termino-
logy, the executive owns the decision. The role of the analyst is to support the executive
in his task. Fundamentally, it is the task of the analyst to provide the information needed
to construct the uncertainty proﬁles associated with each alternative. The enumeration of
the alternatives is perhaps a task for the analyst.
It is the executives prerogative as well as responsibility to say which alternative is pre-
ferred. Thus, an implicit task of the executive is to compare the alternatives. This compar-
ison makes use of the uncertainty proﬁles provided by the analyst. Thus, preference
between alternatives is a subjective reﬂection of the attitude of the executive who owns
the decision. Essentially then the preference between the alternative is based upon what
we call the attitudinal character of the executive. As we indicated earlier one method of
comparing alternatives is to use surrogate features to aid in this comparison. This situation
means that the surrogate features, which are going to be used to help select between the
alternatives, must reﬂect the attitudinal character of the executive. Thus, the construction
of functions (algorithms) used to obtain the values of the surrogate features, i.e., the rep-
resentative value and measure of variability, of an alternative must incorporate informa-
tion about the attitudinal character of the executive.
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allow the inclusion of decision attitude in the calculation of representative value little eﬀort
has been paid to the formulation of measures of deviation which allow for the inclusion of
executives attitudinal character. Our main interest here is to begin to take some steps
toward the development of measures of variation of uncertainty proﬁles that enable the
inclusion of decision attitude of the responsible decision maker.
2. Attitudinal character and representative values
We begin ﬁrst by looking at some approaches for obtaining a representative value of an
uncertainty proﬁle in a special case of uncertainty decision making called decision making
under ignorance (DMUI) as this case allows us to directly focus on the inclusion of deci-
sion attitude. The problem of DMUI was discussed in considerable detail in the classic vol-
ume by Luce and Raiﬀa [3]. Fig. 1 provides a useful framework to discuss this problem.
Here, we have to choose one of the alternatives from the set {A1, . . . ,Am}. The payoﬀ
for selecting an alternative depends upon the value of some variable U whose value lies in
the set X = {x1, . . . ,xn}. In particular, if we select Ai and U = xj then the payoﬀ to the deci-
sion maker is Cij. In making his choice of alternative the decision maker is interested in
attaining the most payoﬀ.
The uncertainty in this problem arises from the fact that the decision maker is unaware
of the value of U at the time he must select his alternative. The use of the term ignorance is
a reﬂection of the fact that the decision maker has no information distinguishing the
occurrence of the elements in the set X, all he knows is that U will assume one of the values
xi, i = 1, . . . ,n.
In [3] a number of approaches were suggested to aid in the solution of this problem
using the idea of a representative value. One of these is called the Maximin approach.
Under this approach, for each alternative, we ﬁnd the worst outcome and then select
the alternative with the best of the worst. Under this method for each alternative Ai we
calculate Val(Ai) = Minj[Cij] and then select Aq such that Val(Aq) = Maxi[Val(Ai)]. We
note that this is a very pessimistic decision criteria as we are making our choice based
on considering the worst thing that can happen.
Another approach is the so-called Maximax approach. Here, for each alternative, we
ﬁnd the best outcome and then select the alternative with the best of the best. In this case,
for each alternative Ai we calculate Val(Ai) = Maxj[Cij] and select Aq such that Val(Aq) =
Maxi[Val(Ai)]. We see this is a very optimistic method.x1 xj xn
A1
Ai
Am
C ij
Fig. 1. Decision making under ignorance.
140 R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 42 (2006) 137–158Another approach is the so-called Hurwicz criteria with a level optimist. In this
approach, ﬁrst we calculate for each alternative Ai the value Val(Ai) = aMaxj[Cij] +
(1  a)Minj[Cij] where a 2 [0, 1] and then select Aq such that Val(Aq) = Maxi[Val(Ai)].
Another approach suggested in [3] is based upon the principle of insuﬃcient reason. It is
a neutral approach. Using this approach we calculate ValðAiÞ ¼ 1n
Pn
j¼1cij and again select
Aq such that Val(Aq) = Maxj[Val(Ai)].
We note that the availability of these diﬀerent approaches gives us the ability to incor-
porate some diﬀerent attitudes associated with the decision maker. Another approach sug-
gested in [3] is the minimization of maximum regret method. This method is of a diﬀerent
spirit as it does not involve the determination of a representative value for each alternative.
While we shall not consider this approach further in this work we note that the interested
reader can ﬁnd more details in [4].
In [5] we provided a generalization of these representative approaches using the OWA
operator [6,7]. Using this approach it was suggested that we proceed as follows:
1. Calculate Val(Ai) = F(ci1, . . . ,cin) for each alternative Ai.
2. Select Aq where Aq is such that Val(Aq) = Maxi[Val(Ai)].
In the generalization introduced in [5] the function F is implemented using the OWA
operator. We recall the OWA operator is a mapping F : Rn ! R such that
F ða1; . . . ; anÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1wjbj where bj is the jth largest of the ai and the wj are a collection
of weights such that wj 2 [0, 1] and
Pn
j¼1wj ¼ 1.
We observe that the OWA operator involves a reordering and then a simple weighted
averaging. However here, the weights are not directly assigned to the arguments but to the
position the of the argument in the ordering.
Note 1. If p is a permutation such that p(j) is the index of the jth largest ai then bj = ap(j)
and
F ða1; . . . ; anÞ ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjapðjÞ.Note 2. IfW is a vector whose jth component is wj and B is a vector whose jth component
is bj then F(a1, . . . ,an) =W
TB. We callW the weighting vector and B the ordered argument
vector.
We observe that F is a mean operator [6], it is commutative, monotonic, and bounded,
Minj[aj] 6 F(a1, . . . ,an) 6Maxj[aj]. The boundedness implies it is idempotent, if aj = a for
all j, then F(a1, . . . ,an) = a.
The use of the OWA operator aggregation allows us to provide a whole family of func-
tions F(a1, . . . ,an) parameterized by the weighting vector W. At times, we shall ﬁnd it use-
ful to use the function FW(a1, . . . ,an) to emphasize the parameterizing vector W.
We now see that by appropriately selecting the parameterizing vector W we can model
each of the previously deﬁned imperatives for DMUI. IfW =W* where wn = 1 and wj = 0
for j5 n we attain F(a1, . . . ,an) = Minj[aj] which is the pessimistic maximin approach. If
W =W* where w1 = 1 and wj = 0 for j5 1 we attain F(a1, . . . ,an) = Maxj[aj] which is
the optimistic maxima approach. If W ¼ W Ha where w1 = a and wn = 1  a and all other
wj = 0 we get F(a1, . . . ,an) = aMaxi(ai) + (1  a)Mini[ai]. This is the Hurwicz criteria with
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F ða1; . . . ; anÞ ¼ 1n
Pn
j¼1aj. This is the neutral approach. The median can be obtained under
this approach. Here, if n is odd, then we useW such that wnþ1
2
¼ 1 and wj = 0 for all other j.
If n is even then we use W such that wn
2
¼ wn
2þ1 ¼ 0:5. We shall refer to this as Wmed.
Another example is the Olympic average. Here, w1 = wn = 0 and all other wj ¼ 1n2.
More generally, we can have w1 ¼ w2 ¼    ¼ wk1 ¼ 0 and wn ¼ wn1 ¼    ¼ wnk2þ1 ¼ 0
and wj ¼ 1nðk1þk2Þ for other j.
We note that the OWA operator is parameterized by the choice of the weighting vector,
thus the type of aggregation is determined by the weighting vector W. In [6] we associated
with the OWA operator two measures. The ﬁrst is called the attitudinal character. We
deﬁne this as A CðW Þ ¼Pnj¼1wj njn1. It can be easily shown for all W, A  C(W) 2 [0, 1].
The second measure. called the dispersion, is deﬁned as HðW Þ ¼ Pnj¼1wj lnðwjÞ.
It was shown in [6] that A  C(W*) = 1, A  C(WN) = 0.5, A  C(WH) = a and
A  C(W*) = 0. This led to the interpretation of A  C(W) as the degree of optimism asso-
ciated with the decision process. Thus W* is the most optimistic and W* is the least opti-
mistic. Thus, here with W we are providing a vehicle for incorporating the responsible
decision makers attitude in the process.
Essentially, using this decision making procedure we are using Val(a1, . . . ,an) =
F(a1, . . . ,an) as the representative value for the uncertain alternative. Thus W* provides
a very optimistic representative value, while W* is a very pessimistic representative value.
It can be shown that if W is symmetric, wj = wnj+1 for all j, then A  C(W) = 0.5.
Thus, symmetric weighting vectors are all neutral with respect to attitude. Thus,Wn,Wmed
and WH with a = 0.5 all have A  C(W) = 0.5.
It can also be shown that as more of the weight is allocated to the elements ofW above
the middle the more A  C(W) moves toward one while if the weights move toward the
bottom of W then A  C(W) moves toward zero. It can also be shown that W* is the only
W that has A  C(W) = 1 and similarly W* is unique in attaining A  C(W*) = 0.
Another special class of W are those for which wq = 1 and wj = 0 for j5 q. Here
F(a1, . . . ,an) = bq, the qth largest payoﬀ. In this case A-CðwqÞ ¼ nqn1.
One approach to determining the weights in an OWA aggregation was suggested in [8].
This approach is based upon the use of a function f : [0, 1]! [0, 1] having the properties:
(1) f(0) = 0, (2) f(1) = 1 and (3) f(x)P f(y) if xP y. Such a function was denoted as a
BUM function as an acronym for a Basic Unit interval Monotonic function. Using the
function f we can get as our weights as wj ¼ f jn
  f j1n  for j = 1, . . . ,n. Here we are
parameterizing the aggregation by choosing the function f. One advantage of this is that
we can deﬁne our aggregation imperative independently of the cardinality of the argu-
ments. That is we can generate the weight for any n. In [8] the concept of attitudinal char-
acter was generalized to be deﬁned with respect to a BUM function f. In particular
A-Cðf Þ ¼ R 10 f ðxÞdx. It is the area under f.
Another widely used approach to obtaining the weights was suggested by OHagan
[9,10]. He suggested specifying a degree of optimism a and the use a mathematical pro-
gramming approach to determine the weights W such that A  C(W) = a, and such that
we maximize H(W).
An interpretation of using OWA aggregation to determine the representative value of
an alternative was suggested in [5]. In the following, we shall suppress the index of the
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ValðAÞ ¼Pnj¼1wjbj where bj is the jth largest of the Ci. In order to provide this interpre-
tation we ﬁrst note that the wj have the properties of a probability distribution,
wj 2 [0, 1] and
Pn
j¼1wj ¼ 1. In [5] it was suggested that wj can be viewed as a kind of atti-
tudinal probability distribution (APD). Under this wj can be interpreted as the probability
that the jth best thing will happen. We see that for the optimist, who uses W*, we have
w1 = 1. In this case, we are assuming a probability of one that the best thing will happen.
For the pessimist, who usesW*, we have wn = 1, here we are assuming a probability of one
that the worst thing will happen. We note in the case of WN we have wj ¼ 1n and here we
assume each outcome has the same probability of occurrence. We are neutral with respect
to our attitude. In the case W Ha we have w1 = a and wn = 1  a. Here is we have a prob-
ability a that the best will happen and a probability 1  a that the worst will happen.
Thus, we see here where the decision maker is selecting some decision attitude this pro-
cess can be equivalently viewed as a process in which the decision maker is eﬀectively pro-
viding an attitudinal probability distribution (APD) over the space of possible payoﬀs.
Under this interpretation the valuation function F ða1; . . . ; anÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1wjbj can be
viewed as a kind of attitudinal expected value A-EV. Thus, in this spirit, our decision pro-
cedure is to calculate an expected value, albeit an attitudinal one and then compare the
alternatives with respect to these attitudinal expected values.
We note under this interpretation HðW Þ ¼ Pnj¼1wj lnðwjÞ can be viewed as the
entropy of the attitudinal probability distribution. We note that the maximal entropy is
obtained for the distribution in which wj ¼ 1n. Furthermore, the minimal entropy is
obtained for any distribution where wj = 1 for some j. Thus W* and W* are minimal
entropy distributions.
In this framework, the approach suggested by OHagan [9,10] is seen as one of obtain-
ing the weights, the attitudinal probabilities, such that they have the maximal entropy
given the desired degree of optimism a. As such, these have been called the ME-OWA
weights, for maximal entropy.
Using the interpretation of the weights as an APD, we can also provide a semantics
associated with the use of a BUM function f to provide the weights in the OWA aggrega-
tion. In Fig. 2 we provide a prototypical BUM function. As we shall subsequently see, this
function is closely related to what we shall call an attitudinal cumulative probability func-
tion ACPD.1
1
Fig. 2. Prototypical bum function.
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ability of xi the cumulative probability function is deﬁned as F ðaÞ ¼
P
xi6api. F(a) is the
probability that R is less than or equal to a, Prob(R 6 a).
Consider now a corresponding attitudinal version of a cumulative probability function.
In particular, we let g : I! I be such that g(y) is the decision makers attitudinal probabil-
ity that the resolution of an uncertain situation will be an outcome whose value is less than
or equal to y proportion of the available outcomes. Thus if g(0.5) = 0.9, the decision mak-
ing is expressing the belief that there is a 90% chance that the resolution of an uncertain sit-
uation will be a value less or the midpoint, median, of the available outcomes. What is
clear is that g(1) must equal one, as there is always 100% probability that the outcome will
be less or equal to the largest value. It is also clear g(y1)P g(y2) if y1 > y2, for there is
always a greater probability that the outcome will be less than y1 portion of the outcomes
then y2 portion of the outcome portion.
We see that with this function we are essentially specifying a kind of cumulative prob-
ability distribution, however, here the argument instead of being actual values of variable
is the proportions of outcomes. In the function g(y) shown in Fig. 3 the decision maker is
expressing a very optimistic attitude, he believes that there is a zero chance that the out-
come will be anything but the best value. On the other hand, the g(y) shown in Fig. 4
shows the exact opposite. Here, the decision maker is expressing the belief that there is
100% chance that the outcome will equal to the lowest value.1
1
g(y)
y
Fig. 3. Optimistic function.
1
1
g(y)
y
Fig. 4. Pessimistic function.
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f(y) = 1  g(1  y). In particular, we see if g is as in Fig. 3 then f(y) = 0 for y = 0 and
f(y) = 1 for all y5 0 and if g is as in Fig. 4 then f(1) = 1 and f(y) = 0 for all y5 1. We
note if g(y) = y then f(y) = y. With f(y) = Prob(R 6 y) then f(y) = 1  Prob(R 6 1  y) =
Prob(RP 1  y).
3. Measuring deviation of an uncertainty proﬁle
In the preceding, we have discussed an approach to DMUI. In this approach, we used
the decision attitude to determine a function Val. This function was used to obtain a
unique scalar representative value associated with an alternative. We then compared these
representative values, preferring the alternative with the largest value. In some cases, the
use of a scalar representative may not be suﬃcient to make a clear choice between alter-
natives. Consider the case below.
100
100
0A1
A 2 50
In this case an optimistic decision maker, would ﬁnd the representative value for both
alternatives the same, 100. Simply using this he we would be indiﬀerent between the two
alternatives, however clearly A2 is a better choice then A1.
In the situation below if we use the normative approach both have representative value
zero, however, there is a big distinction between the two alternatives.
1000
20
-1000A1
A 2 -20
At the heart of these observations is an idea closely related to the concept of variance
used in probability theory. In particular, in the decision process we may desire to use, in
addition to the representative value, information about how an alternatives outcome can
deviate from this representative value.
In this section, we shall began to introduce some tools with which to quantify a variance
like concept useful in this attitudinal type decision making. We shall refer to this as a mea-
sure of deviation. As we see, the normal variance is a special case of this.
Before we turn to our main concern, the concept of deviation, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review the
idea of induced OWA operators, IOWA operator [11,12]. Formally, an IOWA operator is
used to aggregate collections of pairs each of which is of the form hvi,aii. Within these
pairs vi is called the order inducing variable and ai is called the argument. In [12] the fol-
lowing procedure for performing the IOWA aggregation was introduced. Let W be an
R.R. Yager / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 42 (2006) 137–158 145OWA weighing vector of dimension n, its components sum to one lie in the unit interval.
Let BV be an n-dimensional vector whose jth component is the argument value of the pair
having the jth largest value for the order inducing variable. BV is the ordered argument
vector. Using W and BV we calculate the IOWA aggregation of the collection of pairs
hvi,aii (i = 1, . . . ,n) as FW(hvi,aii, . . . , hvn,ani) =WTBV. Thus, the components of BV are
the argument values, the ais, ordered by their order inducing value. The following simple
example illustrates this process:
Example. FW(h50,a1i, h60,a2i, h40,a3i) = w1a2 + w2a1 + w3a3.
Formally, if we let v-id be an index function such that v-id(j) is the index of pair with the
jth largest order inducing values then F W ðhv1; a1i; hv2; a2i; . . . ; hvn; aniÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1wjav-idðjÞ.Note. Its worth observing that while the ai must be numeric the vi can be drawn from a
scale having only an ordering. This feature allows the use of IOWA for performing aggre-
gations mixing numeric and linguistic quantities.
We now turn to the concept of deviation. Consider a decision alternative with potential
payoﬀs (c1,c2, . . . ,cn). Assume that we are calculating the representative value of this alter-
native using an OWA operator with weighting vector W = [w1, . . . ,wn]. Here wj can be
viewed as the attitudinal probability that the jth best thing will happen and our represen-
tative value can be viewed as the attitudinal expected value, A-EðAÞ ¼Pnj¼1wjbj, where bj
is the jth largest of the ci. We can also express this as A-EðAÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1wjcpðjÞ where p(j) is
the index of the jth largest ci. For simplicity, at times we shall refer to A-E(A) as l.
The interpretation of the representative value (valuation function) as a kind of attitu-
dinal expected value leads us to look toward the classic concept of variance to provide
inspiration for the construction of a measure of deviation. We recall that the classic idea
of variance is the expected value of the square of the diﬀerence between the expected value
and the individual outcome values.
As in the case of ordinary variance, central to our proposed concept of deviation is the
square of the diﬀerence between l, the attitudinal expected value, and the individual out-
come values value. We deﬁne Di = (ci  l)2.
Normally, the variance is obtained by taking the expected value of this variable. If we
follow this idea here, then the weight associated with Di is its attitudinal probability, how-
ever, here, the attitudinal probability is determined not by Di but by ci. Thus, here we must
use the concept of the IOWA operator. In particular, we deﬁne the deviation of alternative
A, Dev(A) as
DevðAÞ ¼ F W ðhc1;D1i; hc2;D2i; . . . ; hcn;DniÞ ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjDpðjÞ.
Here, p(j) is the index of the jth largest payoﬀ.
Thus, we are IOWA aggregating the pairs hci,Dii where ci is the order inducing variable
and Di is the argument. We are getting a weighted average of the Di. Here, the weight (atti-
tudinal probability) associated with Di is the same as the attitudinal probability associated
with ci.
The following simple example will illustrate this.
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c1 c2 c3 c3
10 3 20 5
LetW be such that: w1 = 0.5, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.2 and w4 = 0, we are moderately optimistic.
To obtain the attitudinal expected value, we order the payoff as
cidð1Þ ¼ c3 ¼ 20; cidð2Þ ¼ c1 ¼ 10; cidð3Þ ¼ c4 ¼ 5; cidð4Þ ¼ c2 ¼ 3;
and then calculate l ¼Pnj¼1wjcpðjÞ ¼ ð.5Þ20þ ð.3Þð10Þ þ ð.2Þ5þ ð0Þð3Þ ¼ 14 We now
calculate the variable, Di = (ci  140)2
D1 ¼ ð10 14Þ2 ¼ 16; D2 ¼ ð3 14Þ2 ¼ 121; D3 ¼ ð20 14Þ2 ¼ 36 and
D4 ¼ ð5 14Þ2 ¼ 81
We now use this to calculate
DevðAÞ ¼ F W ðhc1;D1i; hc2;D2i; hc3;D3i; hc4;D4iÞ;
DevðAÞ ¼ F W ðh10; 16i; h3; 121i; h20; 36i; h5; 81iÞ.
With c being the order inducing variable we get
Dc-idð1Þ ¼ D3 ¼ 36; Dc-idð2Þ ¼ D1 ¼ 16; Dc-idð3Þ ¼ D4 ¼ 81 and Dc-idð4Þ ¼ D2 ¼ 121.
Using this we have Dev(A) = (.5)36 + (.3)(16) + (2)(81) = 39.
Let us look at this measure of deviation for some special cases of W. The ﬁrst case is
where W =WN, here wj ¼ 1n for all j. In this case, l ¼ 1n
Pn
j¼1cj and Di = (ci  l)2. Here,
there is no need to reorder since all wj ¼ 1n. Thus, we have
DevðAÞ ¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
Di ¼ 1n
Xn
j¼1
ci  1n
Xn
j¼1
cj
 !2
¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
c2i 
1
n
Xn
j¼1
cj
 !2
.
This is closely related to the usual concept of variance.
Consider the case whereW =W*, this is the pure optimist, w1 = 1 and wj = 0 for j5 1.
Here, with p(j) the index of the jth largest ci we get l =Maxk[ck] = cp(1), the largest payoff.
In this case Di = (ci  l)2 = (ci  cp(1))2. Since Dev ¼
Pn
j¼1wjDpðjÞ and w1 = 1 and wj = 0
for all j5 1 we get Dev = Dp(1). However since Dp(1) = (Cp(1)  l)2 = (Cp(1)  Cp(1))2 = 0
we have Dev = 0.
Thus, the pure optimist sees no deviation from the representative value. He will obtain
Maxi[ci] with no possibility of deviation. He is sure that he will get best payoff.
Similarly, for the case of pure pessimism. Here W =W*, wj = n for j5 n and wn = 1,
and we get l =Mini[ci] = cp(n). In this case Di = (ci  cp(n))2 and DevðAÞ ¼ F W ðhc1;D1i;
hc2;D2i; . . . ; hcn;DniÞ ¼
Pn
j¼1wjDpðjÞ where p(j) is the index of the jth largest ci. Since
wn = 1 and all other wj are zero we get Dev(A) = Dp(n) = (cp(n)  cp(n))2 = 0. Thus, here
again, we get no perceived deviation from the representative value. The pessimist sees
himself as getting the worst payoff and sees no possibility for deviation, he is sure of
getting the worst payoff.
0.25
0 0.5 1 α
Fig. 5. Plot of a(1  a).
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variation is perceived. That is l = cp(q) and Dev = 0. Thus, here the situation is assuming
kind of absolute certainty.
A useful notation can be introduced to study this idea of deviation. Letting bj = cp(j),
the jth largest payoff, we can express the attitudinal expected value for a given W as
l ¼Pnj¼1wjbj. In addition, letting dj = (bj  l)2 using this in the previously introduced
deﬁnition of Dev (deviation) we get Dev ¼Pnj¼1wjdj, which can alternatively be expressed
as
Dev ¼
Xn
j¼1
wj
Xn
k¼1
wkðbj  bkÞ2
 !
.
We now consider the case of the Hurwicz decision function, w1 = a and wn = 1  a. With
bj indicating the jth largest of the payoffs we have l = ab1 + (1  a)bn. We now consider
the deviation
Dev ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjdj ¼ ad1 þ ð1 aÞdn ¼ aðl b1Þ2 þ ð1 aÞðl bnÞ2
¼ að1 aÞðb1  bnÞ2.
If we consider the case where (b1  bn) = 1, see Fig. 5, then Dev = a(1  a) and we see
that with respect to a it is symmetric about 0.5. Furthermore for a = 0 we get Dev = 0.
Dev monotonically increases until a = 0.5 where we get Dev = 0.25. The function now
decreases until a = 1 where Dev = 0.4. An alternative measure of deviation
In the preceding we have presented a deﬁnition for a measure of an alternatives devi-
ation from its representative value. This deﬁnition is associated with a decision procedure
that is based upon a choice of a particular decision attitude, W. The decision attitude is
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tive, its representative value. This scalar value can be viewed as an attitudinal expected
value associated with the alternative. The idea of deviation was introduced to provide a
further scalar characterization of an alternatives uncertainty proﬁle. Specially the notion
of deviation was introduced to provide some information about the potential deviation of
an alternatives payoﬀ from its representative value.
While our preceding deﬁnition of deviation is a reasonable deﬁnition, it may not always
capture what we desire in a measure of deviation in applications in which we are trying to
evaluate and compare alternatives. In particular, the property that Dev is zero when we
are using a representative value based on W* (wn = 1) or W
* (W1 = 1) is somewhat trou-
bling in this application. It would appear a ‘‘rational’’ decision making entity we would
want to be aware of the fact that there is indeed some possibility for variation from the
representative value. As a matter of fact, the use of W* or W
* would seem to provide
an opportunity for the maximal possibility of variation from the expected outcome.
Before proceeding we want to make a distinction between two situations in which we
may use a valuation function based on the the choice of decision attitude W. For illustra-
tive purposes we shall consider the caseW*, for its ease of explanation. In one situation the
decision making entity may objectively choose to useW* so as to implement a conservative
decision making strategy, a kind of protect your rear approach. This choice does not imply
that they are devoutly pessimistic, believe the worst thing will undoubtedly happen, but
have chosen a conservative decision rule. We shall refer to this entity as a conservative.
The second situation in which a decision making entity may use W* is when the entity
is a devout pessimistic, it believes the worst outcome will occur. We shall refer to these
two types respectively as a pragmatic W* and devout W*. Since both these entities, the
pragmatic and the devout, use W* for their calculation of the representative value, their
ls will be same. However, their perceptions of the possibility of deviation may be diﬀer-
ent. In the second case, the devout pessimist, he sees no possibility of deviation from his
obtaining the worst outcome. On the other hand, the pragmatic pessimist, the conservative
decision maker, is surely aware of the possibility of deviation from his representative
value.
We note that in the case of the devout W* the fact that Dev = 0 is not at all surprising.
since he is certain that the worst thing will happen. On the other hand the pragmatic W*
entity may not be comfortable with this value for the deviation.
The preceding digression leads us to conclude that their may be a need for alternative
measures of deviation then the one we just introduced. In anticipation of our introducing
other measures of deviation we shall refer to the concept of deviation we have already
introduced as type I deviation, DevI.
We now introduce a second formulation for the concept of deviation which we shall call
type II attitudinal deviation. Here again, we shall make use of the IOWA operator.
Again, we consider an alternative with an uncertainty proﬁle simply consisting of the
collection of possible payoﬀs (c1, . . . ,cn). We shall assume that the decision makers atti-
tude in evaluating the alternatives is captured by the vector W = [w1, . . . ,wn]. Viewing
these as the attitudinal probabilities our representative value, attitudinal expected value,
is l ¼Pnj¼1wjbj where bj is the jth largest of the payoﬀs. Again, we shall denote
Di = (ci  l)2. However here we shall deﬁne the type II deviation as
DevII ¼ F W ðhc1;D1i; hc2;D2i; . . . ; hcn;DniÞ.
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inducing variable is ci, the negation of ci, the ordering of the Di is based on the inverse
ordering of the ci. It is the opposite of that used in DevI. Thus, if dj = (bj  l)2, the square
of the diﬀerence between the jth largest payoﬀ and the attitudinal expected value then
DevII ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjdnjþ1 ¼
Xn
j¼1
wnjþ1dj.
Let us ﬁrst apply this to our previous example.
Example. We recall for the alternative the uncertainty proﬁle is
c1 c2 c3 c4
10 3 20 5
and W is such that: w1 = 0.5, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.2 and w4 = 0. Here again l = 14. In this
case b1 = 20, b2 = 10, b3 = 5, b4 = 3 and from this we get
d1 ¼ ð14 20Þ2 ¼ 36; d2 ¼ ð14 10Þ2 ¼ 16; d3 ¼ ð14 5Þ2 ¼ 81;
d4 ¼ ð14 3Þ2 ¼ 121.
Using the type II deviation we get
DevII ¼
X4
j¼1
wjd5j ¼ w1d4 þ w2d3 þ w3d2 þ w4d1;
DevII ¼ ð.5Þð121Þ þ ð.3Þ81þ ð.2Þð16Þ þ ð0Þ36 ¼ 88.
Here, we get 88 instead of 39.
Let us look at this deﬁnition of deviation for some special cases ofW.We ﬁrst consider the
casewhereW =W*, the pure optimistw1 = 1 andwj = 0 for all j5 1. In this case,l = b1, the
largest possible payoff. Here, dj = (bj  l)2 = (bj  b1)2. For this attitude,W*, we have
DevII ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjdnjþ1 ¼ w1dn1þ1 ¼ dn.
Since dn = (bn  b1)2, we have the square of the difference between the biggest and the
smallest payoff. Thus, here for the optimistic attitude we are getting the maximal payoff
as our representative value and the square of the difference between the biggest and the
smallest payoffs as our deviation.
Similarly, for the case when W =W*, the pure pessimist, wn = 1. In this case, l = bn,
the smallest possible payoff. Here, dj = (bj  bn)2. For this attitude
DevII ¼
Xn
j¼1
wjdnjþ1 ¼
Xn
j¼1
wndnnþ1 ¼ d1.
Here then DevII = (b1  bn)2, again the difference between the biggest and the smallest
payoffs.
More generally consider an attitude in which wq = 1 and wj = 0 for j5 q. Here, l = bq,
the qth largest payoff. In this case, DevII ¼
Pn
j¼1wjdnjþ1 ¼ dnjþ1. Thus, here
DevII ¼ ðbq  bnqþ1Þ2;
it is the diﬀerence between bq is its complement.
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always have DevIIP DevI.
A notable class of weighting vectors are those that are symmetric. W is a symmetric
weighting vector if wnj+1 = wj. We recall for these type of vectors A  C(W) = 0.5, they
are have neutral attitude regarding their aggregation of the payoﬀs. We recall the simple
average where wj ¼ 1n and the median are symmetric. The following theorem, which fol-
lows directly from the deﬁnitions of DevI and DevII holds for these symmetric type of W.
Theorem. If W is a symmetric weighting vector then DevI = DevII.
We now consider the case of the Hurwicz decision criteria. We recall here w1 = a and
wn = 1  a and that l ¼ ab1 þ abn. In this case DevII ¼
Pn
j¼1wjdnjþ1 ¼ adn þ ad1. With
dn ¼ ðl bnÞ2 ¼ ðab1 þ abn  bnÞ2 ¼ a2ðb1  bnÞ2;
d1 ¼ ðl b1Þ ¼ ðab1 þ abn  b1Þ ¼ ð1 aÞ2ðb1  bnÞ2;
we get
DevII ¼ a3ðb1  bnÞ2 þ ð1 aÞ3ðb1  bnÞ2 ¼ ða3 þ ð1 aÞ3Þðb1  bnÞ2
¼ ða3 þ a3Þðb1  bnÞ2.
We note this is also symmetric about a ¼ 1
2
. We observe that this assumes its largest value,
(b1  bn)2, with a = 0 and a = 1 and it decreases until it reaches a minimum of 14 ðb1  bnÞ2
when a = 0.5.
We recall that under the assumption of Hurwicz attitude we showed that DevI ¼
ðaÞðaÞðb1  bnÞ2. We also note that DevI attains a maximum value of 14 ðb1  bnÞ2 for
a 2 [0,1]. Since DevII has a minimum value of 14 ðb1  bnÞ2 for a 2 [0,1] then we see that
in the case of Hurwicz attitude DevIIP DevI for all a 2 [0,1].
Closely related to the Hurwicz weights are what we shall call the quasi-Hurwicz
weights. In this case, we have W such that wj = a and wnj+1 = 1  a and wk = 0 for all
others. We note for the pure Hurwicz weights j = 1. We now state the following theorem:
Theorem. If W is quasi-Hurwicz type then DevIIP DevI.Proof. l ¼ abj þ abnjþ1
DevI ¼ aðl bjÞ2 þ aðl bnjþ1Þ2
¼ aðabj þ abnjþ1  bjÞ2 þ ð2Þðabj þ abjnþ1  bnjþ1Þ2
¼ aðaðbnjþ1  bjÞÞ2 þ aðaðbnjþ1  bjÞÞ2
¼ aaðbnjþ1  bjÞ2;
DevII ¼ aðl bnjþ1Þ2 þ aðl bjÞ2
¼ aðaðbnjþ1  bjÞÞ2 þ aðaðbnjþ1  bjÞÞ2
¼ ða3 þ a3Þðbnjþ1  bjÞ2.
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have considered, this is not always the case as the following counter example1
illustrates. hExample. Assume W is such that w1 = 0.2, w2 = 0.7 and w3 = 0.1. Let C ¼ ½2; 37 ;1
hence b1 = 2, b2 ¼ 27 and b3 = 1. Using this we get
l ¼ ð.2Þð2Þ þ ð0:7Þ  3
7
 
þ ð0:1Þð1Þ ¼ 0.
In this case d1 = (2)
2 = 4, d2 ¼ 949
 
and d3 = 1. For this example we have
DevI ¼ ð0:2Þð4Þ þ ð0:7Þ 9
49
þ ð0:1Þð1Þ ¼ 1:028; DevII ¼ ð.1Þð4Þ þ ð0:7Þ 9
49
þ ð0:2Þ1
¼ 0:72.
Here DevIP DevII.
Here we have introduced a second measure of deviation associated with a alternative
other measures of deviation may be needed to help formalize diﬀerent decision makers
concept of deviation.5. Understanding the role of measures of deviation
An important and complex issue in the decision making process is how to use the infor-
mation about deviation associated with an available alternative. In order to address this
issue, we must understand the two roles of the measure of deviation of an alternative.
One role is as an indication of the possible deviation from its representative value we
can have when selecting the alternative. The second role is as a measure of the certainty,
lack of variability, in the payoﬀ associated with the selecting of an alternative.
Let us consider the ﬁrst role of the measure of deviation, characterizing the possible
variation from the representative value. In this case, we shall see that the preference for
large or small deviations is related to the attitudinal character, A  C(W), of the weighting
vector W used to calculate the representative value. We refer to Fig. 6.
Here we see that as the attitudinal character decreases, we prefer larger deviations from
the representative value while for larger values of the attitudinal character of the W we
prefer smaller deviations from the representative value. This situation is based on the fact
that for Ws with a small value of A  C we are calculating the representative value as the
minimum of the possible outcomes and hence the bigger the deviation the better the pay-
oﬀ. On the other hand for Ws with large value of A  C we are calculating the represen-
tative value as the maximum of the possible outcomes and hence the bigger the deviation
the worse the payoﬀ.
In the case where A  C approaches 0.5, a neutral value we have no preference for large
or small deviations with respect to its role as indicator of possible deviation from the rep-
resentative value.1 I thank Vladik Kreinovich (University Texas at El Paso) for providing me with this counter example.
Prefer
Large
Deviations
Prefer
Small
Deviations
0.5 10
A-C(W)
Fig. 6. Preference of deviation from representative value as function of A  C.
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we are indiﬀerent between small and large deviations as it is unclear whether a deviation
from the representative value will be better or worse.
Now let us consider the second role of a measure of deviation, as an indicator of the
certainty associated with the selection of an alternative. Generally, all else being equal,
one prefers certainty2 in decision choices and hence small deviations.
When we try to simultaneously look at these two roles of the measure of deviation the sit-
uation becomes a little more complex with respect to what are desirable values for the mea-
sure of deviation. One clear case is when we have a W with a large A  C(W), our
representative value is Max-like. In this situation, it would appear alternatives with a small
deviation are desirable with respect to the both the interpretations of deviation. On the other
hand, with a valuation function that is based on aW that has a value forA  C near zero the
situation is not as clear cut with respect to preference for small or large deviations. Our desire
for certainty prefers small Dev while our desire to avoid the Min, the representative value,
prefers large deviations. In this case, ultimate preference with respect to the measure of devi-
ation may depend upon other considerations supplied by the decision maker.
Another case that is notable is when A  C(W)! 0.5. Here, as we have already pointed
out we are indiﬀerent to the size of deviation with respect to its role as an indication of the
possibility of receiving a better or worse payoﬀ then the representative value. However,
since small deviations reﬂect certainty when using these types neutral valuation functions
we would prefer small deviations. As we shall subsequently see, the case when wj ¼ 1n,
which leads to A  C(W) = 0.5 is essentially that associated with the classic variance.
What this seems to indicate is that the generally accepted preference for alternatives with
small variance may be a reﬂection of it being located in the neutral zone, A  C(W) = 0.5
rather than an unconditioned preference for alternatives with small variance.
In the preceding, we have indicated the complexity of the concept we are trying to cap-
ture with our measure of deviation. We have also suggested two basic methods for calcu-
lating the deviation, neither of which completely dominates the other.
We feel that, for a particular application, the appropriate form for a measure of devi-
ation may require some construction using ideas of fuzzy rule based modeling [13]. These
models will use the preceding deﬁnitions, DevI and DevII and perhaps other deﬁnitions of
deviation as primary building blocks in the construction of the rule bases.2 It is interesting to note that this may not always be the case. In some situations of uncertain decision making,
such as gambling, the decision maker may enjoy the excitement of the uncertainty of the process. In these cases, a
larger deviation may be preferred.
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what we shall call the measure of cautious deviation: DevC =Max[DevI,DevII].
6. Including probabilistic information in the uncertainty proﬁle
In the preceding, we considered the situation in which we had no knowledge about the
probabilities associated with the outcome states. All we used to obtain the representative
value of an alternative was the decision attitude. We assumed a decision attitude in the
form of a BUM function f : [0,1]! [0,1]. Here, we shall generalize the situation by assum-
ing in addition the availability of information in the form of an associated probability dis-
tribution over the outcomes. Here then for each alternative its uncertainty proﬁle consists
of a collection [ci, . . . ,cn] of possible payoﬀs and an associated probability distribution
[pi, . . . ,pn]. Here pi, is the probability that ci will occur. Essentially, we have a collection
of outcome pairs (ci,pi), i = 1, . . . ,n.
In [14] we suggested an approach to calculating the representative value for an alterna-
tive in this type of situation. As we shall see, our approach makes use of a kind of com-
bined probability. We denote the representative value of the alternative as
ValðAÞ ¼
Xn
j¼1
~wjcpðjÞ;
where p(j) is the index of the jth largest payoﬀ. Furthermore, in this case ~wj ¼ f ðSjÞ
f ðSj1Þ where Sj ¼
Pj
k¼1ppðkÞ. Here, Sj is the sum of the probabilities associated with the
jth largest payoﬀs. We can easily show that ~wj 2 ½0; 1 and
P
j~wj ¼ 1. Thus we see that
the ~wj have the properties of a probability distribution. We shall refer to the ~wj as the com-
bined normal and attitudinal (CNA) probabilities. Again, we see that Val(A) can be
viewed as a kind of representative (expected) value over the outcome space in the context
a decision attitude f.
At times, the following simple notation may be useful. We shall let bj be the jth largest
of the outcomes and let rj be the probability associated with the bj = cp(j) and rj = pp(j).
Using this notation we get ValðAÞ ¼Pnj¼1~wjbj where ~wj ¼ f ðSjÞ  f ðSj1Þ with Sj ¼Pjkrj.
We observe that if rj = 0 then Sj = Sj1 and hence ~wj ¼ 0. Thus, any outcome with zero
probability makes no contribution to the representative value.
We now look at this for some special cases of probability distributions. We see that
when pi ¼ 1n for all i then Sj ¼ jn and ~wj ¼ f jn
  f j1n  ¼ wj. This corresponds to the sit-
uation when we just use the pure attitudinal probability. This is not surprising since using
pi ¼ 1n is eﬀectively the same as saying we have no information about the probabilities.
Another important special case is where pq = 1 for some q. Here, one outcome has
probability one. Here, we easily see that ~wk ¼ 1 for k such that p(k) = q and ~wj ¼ 0 for
all other j. Thus, in this case, we are unaﬀected by the decision makers attitude we have
the outcome cq with complete certainty.
We now look at some special cases of f. The ﬁrst case is where f(x) = x. Here
~wj ¼ Sj  Sj1 ¼ rj
and hence ValðAÞ ¼Pnj¼1rjbj ¼Pnj¼1pici. This is the usual expected value. Thus when
f(x) = x, we are essentially assuming no particular attitude regarding optimism or
pessimism.
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r15 0. More generally, ~wk ¼ 1 if bk is the largest outcome that has a non-zero probability.
Similarly, for the pure pessimist, ~wq ¼ 1 if bq is the smallest outcome with a non-zero
probability.
We now turn to the issue of extending our measures of deviation to the situation in
which we have a probability distribution and attitudinal preference f. Let us ﬁrst consider
the case of type I deviation. The extension here is quite clear. We deﬁne
DevI ¼
Xn
j¼1
~wjdj;
where dj = (l  bj)2 with l ¼
P
j~wjbj and ~wj is as just deﬁned.
We note that if f(x) = x, then, as we have shown, ~wj ¼ rj, the probability of the jth larg-
est outcome. Here, l ¼Pnj¼1bjrj ¼Pnl¼1pici, it is the ordinary mean. Furthermore, here
DevI ¼
Pn
j¼1pjðl cjÞ2, it is the usual variance. We see DevI extends the usual deﬁnition
of variance.
The situation with respect to type II variance is more subtle and requires us to be a little
more detailed. We have h(ci,pi), . . . , (cn,pn)i and a function f : [0,1]! [0,1] describing our
attitude, we recall f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and f is monotonic. We again ﬁrst calculate
l ¼Pnj¼1~wjbj where wj = f(Sj)  f(Sj1) and Sj ¼Pjk¼1rj, rj is the probability associated
with bj. To obtain DevII we again introduce dj = (l  bj)2. Here we additionally introduce
g(x) = 1  f(1  x) and use this to deﬁne
DevII ¼
Xn
j¼1
kjdj;
where kj = g(Sj)  g(Sj1) where Sj is as above, Sj ¼
Pj
k¼1rj.
We observe that since f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and f(x)P f(y) if xP y then g(0) = 1 
f(1) = 0, g(1) = 1  f(0) = 1 and if xP y, then 1  x 6 1  y and hence f(1  x) 6 f(1  y)
and therefore g(x)P g(y) if xP y. Thus, g is also a BUM function. This assures us that
the kj satisfy the conditions: kj 2 [0, 1] and
P
jkj ¼ 1. Thus the kj are a kind of probability
distribution. We also see that
kj ¼ gðSjÞ  gðSj1Þ ¼ 1 f ð1 SjÞ  ð1 f ð1 Sj1ÞÞ ¼ f ð1 sj1Þ  f ð1 sjÞ.
Let us look at this for some special cases. First we consider the case where pi ¼ 1n. This
should lead to the original form we had with no probabilities, DevII ¼
Pj
j¼1wnjþ1dj.
We see this as follows. With kj = f(1  Sj1)  f(1  Sj) since with pi ¼ 1n we have Sj ¼ jn
and therefore 1 Sj ¼ 1 jn ¼ njn and 1 sj1 ¼ 1 j1n
  ¼ njþ1n thus kj ¼ f njþ1n 
f njn
  ¼ wnjþ1 hence DevII ¼Pjj¼1kjdj ¼Pnj¼1wnjþ1dj which is the original form.
Consider now the case where f(x) = x. In this case, ~wj ¼ f ðSjÞ  f ðSj1Þ ¼ rj, the prob-
ability of the jth largest payoﬀ. Thus, l ¼Pnj¼1~wjbj ¼Pnj¼1rjbj ¼Pni¼1pici, it is the usual
expected value. Here then, dj = (l  bj)2. We now consider the calculation of
kj = f(1  sj1)  f(1  sj). With f(x) = x we have kj = (1  sj1)  (1  sj) = sj  sj1 = rj.
We get here that with f(x) = x. DevII ¼
Pn
j¼1rjdj ¼ VarI, the usual variance. Thus with
f(x) = x, for both DevI and DevII we get the usual variance.
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generality we shall assume r15 0, the biggest payoﬀ has a non-zero probability. In this
case, ~w1 ¼ f ðS1Þ  f ð0Þ ¼ 1 thus l = b1, it is the largest possible payoﬀ. Here then
dj = (b1  bj)2. Let us now also assume without loss of generality that rn5 0, the worst
possible outcome also has non-zero probability. Consider kj = f(1  Sj1)  f(1  Sj).
Since Sj ¼
Pj
i¼1ri we see that Sj5 1 for all j < n and Sn = 1. Thus kj = 0 for j < n and
kn = 1. Here then DevII =
P
jkjdj = dn = (b1  bn)2.
In a similar way, we can show that for the pure pessimist, f(x) = 0 for x5 1 and
f(1) = 1, we get l = bn and DevII = (b1  bn)2.
In the preceding we assumed that the attitudinal character was expressed in terms of a
BUM function f. In some cases, we may have our attitude directly expressed in terms of a
weighting vector W = [wi, . . . ,wn]. In this case, the process of obtaining the CNA proba-
bilities is slightly diﬀerent. Using this we obtain
~wj ¼ rjwjPn
i¼1riwi
and kj ¼ rjwnjþ1Pn
i¼1riwniþ1
.7. Uncertainty proﬁles based on monotonic set measures
We shall again consider the issue of providing a measure of deviation for an uncertain
alternative. Here, however, the formulation for our knowledge about the uncertainty asso-
ciated with payoﬀs, the uncertainty proﬁle of the alternative, instead of being expressed in
terms of a probability distribution will be expressed in terms of a more general structure.
This structure is a monotonic set measure sometimes called a Sugeno measure [15]. In
order to calculate the representative value in this case we shall make use of the Choquet
integral [16,17].
Consider an alternative whose payoﬀ depends the value of an uncertain variable which
takes its value in the set X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}. If the uncertain variable assumes the value xj
then the payoﬀ is cj. One approach to representing our knowledge about the value of the
uncertain variable is with the aid of monotonic type measure m. Here we have a mapping
m : 2X ! [0, 1] such that for any subset B of X, m(B) indicates the conﬁdence we have in
ﬁnding the true value in B. We assume that m(X) = 1, m(;) = 0 and for any two subsets
of X, B1  B2 we have m(B1) 6 m(B2). Such a function is called a monotonic set measure
and can be used to represent a large class of uncertainty proﬁles [18].
The representative value in this case can be obtained using the Choquet integral [16,17].
Let p be a permutation of the ci, such that p(j) is the index of the jth largest ci. Let
Hj = {xp(i) j i = 1, . . . , j}. It is the subset of values associated with the jth largest payoﬀs.
Let wj = m(Hj)  m(Hj1). Using the Choquet integral the representative value of this
alternative is obtained as l ¼Pnj¼1wjcpðjÞ.
A number of special cases are worth pointing out. The ﬁrst is the additive case. Here, we
associate with each xi a value pi such that lðBÞ ¼
P
X i 62Bpi. This is the ordinary probability
distribution. Another special case is one in which m(;) = 0 and m(B) = 1 for all B5 ;. We
denote this m*. Closely related to this is m* where m*(X) = 1 and m*(B) = 0 for B5 X.
Another related example is one in which is m(;) = 0, m(X) = 1 and m(B) = gjBj. Here,
the measure is related to the number of elements in B, its cardinality. Considerable work
has been done on the representation of knowledge about uncertainty using this type of
measure [19,20].
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implicitly coded in the choice of measure. While we shall not pursue this issue in detail,
we note out the three presentations just introduced, m*, m* and the one in which
m(B) = gjBj all represent the situation in which we have no knowledge of the outcome var-
iable other than that it lies in X. In the ﬁrst representation, m*, we are formulating a very
optimistic measure. Here, we are saying any set we choose will contain the correct out-
come. In the second represented, m*, we are formulating a very pessimistic measure. Here,
we are saying that any set we choose, except the whole space, will not contain the correct
outcome. The third measure is saying that the expectation of ﬁnding the correct outcome
in a set depends simply on the number of elements in the set.
Let us look at the representative value we get for these three cases. For m*, we see that
l(Hj) = 1 for any subset except Hj = ;, hence wj = l(Hj)  l(Hj) is such that wj = 1 for
j = 1 and wj = 0 for all other. In this case then l ¼
Pm
j¼1wjCpðjÞ ¼ Cpð1Þ, where Cp(1) =
MaxiCi. It is the largest outcome. This supports our idea thatm* is an optimistic formulation
of the state of our knowledge. For m*, we see l(Hj) = 0 for Hj5 Hn and l(Hn) = 1. In this
case, wj = 1 for j = n and wj = 0 for j5 n. Here l ¼
Pm
j¼1wjCpðjÞ¼CpðnÞ. It is the smallest pos-
sible outcome. For the case when we use m(B) = gjBj we see l(Hj) = gj and wj = gj  gj1.
Here
l ¼
Xm
j¼1
wjCpðjÞ ¼ ðgj  gj1ÞCpðjÞ.
This is the OWA aggregation operator with wj = (gj  gj1). A special case is where gj = a
for j = 1, . . . ,n  1 and gj = 1 for j = n. Here we get wi = a, wn = 1  a and wj = 0 other-
wise. This gives us l = aMaxi[ci] + (1  a)Mini[ci], the Hurwicz aggregation operator [4].
For the purely additive set measure we have Hj ¼
Pj
k¼1ppðkÞ. Using this we get that
wj ¼ lðHjÞ  lðHj1Þ ¼ ppðjÞ;
and hence l ¼Pjj¼1ppðjÞCpðjÞ ¼ piCi. It is the normal expected value.
We now turn to the association of a measure of deviation with a alternative whose
uncertainty proﬁle is represented using a monotonic set measure.
Again, we shall propose two measures of deviation as was done in the preceding. We
again let Hj = {xp(k) j k = 1, . . . , j} where p(k) is an index of the kth largest payoﬀ and
let wj = m(Hj)  m(Hj1) and l ¼
Pn
j¼1wjcpðjÞ. Using this, we deﬁne our ﬁrst measure of
deviation DevI ¼
Pn
j¼1wjðl cpðjÞÞ2. This is clearly in the spirit of the usual variance mea-
sure. Here we can show if m is a pure additive set measure then DevI reduces to ordinary
variance. If m is m* then, as we have shown, w1 = 1 and wj = 0 otherwise In this case,
m = cp(1) and DevI = 0. For m = m*, we also get DevI = 0.
We now consider the second measure of deviation. First, we must introduce two addi-
tional items. We ﬁrst deﬁne Gj = {xp(j), . . . ,xp(n)} for j = 1, . . . ,n. By convention we shall
denote Gn+1 = ;. Secondly we deﬁne kj = m(Gj)  m(Gj+1). Using these we deﬁne
DevII ¼
Xn
j¼1
kjðl cpðjÞÞ2.
Let us look at this for some special cases. If m is m*, then m(Gj) = 1 for j = 1, . . . ,n and
m(Gn+1) = 0 and we get kj = m(Gj)  m(Gj+1) = 0 for j = 1, . . . ,n  1 and kn = 1. Further-
more, when m is m*, then l = cp(1), the largest payoﬀ. From this, we see in this case
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Xn
j¼1
kjðl cpðjÞÞ2 ¼ ðl cpðjÞÞ2 ¼ ðMaxj½Cj Mini½CiÞ2.
We can similarly show that if m is m*, then l = cp(n) and again DevII = (Maxj[Cj] 
Mini[Ci])
2.
Let us consider the purely additive case here we get mðGjÞ ¼
Pn
k¼jppðkÞ and mðGjþ1Þ ¼Pn
k¼jppðkÞ and hence kj = m(Gj)  m(Gj+1) = pp(j). Thus in n this case, DevII ¼Pn
j¼1ppðjÞðl cpðjÞÞ2 which is the ordinary variance of a probability distribution.
8. Conclusion
We have considered the problem of decision making under uncertainty where an alter-
native is described in terms of an uncertainty proﬁle. The process of comparing alterna-
tives involves comparing their uncertainty proﬁles. Given the complexity of these
proﬁles this task is too diﬃcult. In order to accomplish the comparison we use some scalar
features of the uncertainty proﬁles. One such feature is the representative value. At a meta
level the operation of obtaining this scalar feature involves some process of transforming
the uncertainty proﬁle into a single outcome which we can refer to as the virtual outcome.
How one obtains this virtual outcome is closely related to what we called the attitudinal
character of the decision maker. This feature corresponds to an anticipated payoﬀ associ-
ated with an uncertainty proﬁle. In the classical probabilistic framework this called the
expected value. Another feature associated with a uncertainty proﬁle is related to the pos-
sible deviation from this anticipated outcome. Considerable interest has been focused on
the representative value. Little attention has been paid to the formulation of the deviation
feature in the case of alternative manifestations of attitudinal character and uncertainty
proﬁles. In this work, we have focused on this issue. In particular, we have suggested
two measures of deviation. One of these is closely related to the variance while the other
can be seen as a kind of dual. Implicit in both these measures was the use of the same atti-
tudinal character in calculating the representative value and the deviation. One possibility
which we did not investigate is the use of diﬀerent manifestations of attitudinal character
in the calculation of representative value and the deviation. For example a decision maker
who wants to be very conservative in their determination of representation value but neu-
ral in their determination of deviation would get l =Mini[ci] and Dev ¼ 1n
Pn
i¼1ðl ciÞ2.
In future work we shall investigate this situation.
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